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Abstract
It is shown that well-behaved preference orderings may exhibit the Ellsberg
paradox on the set of unambiguous events as deﬁned by Epstein and Zhang
(2001). Moreover, since such counterexamples can be constructed even when
the set of unambiguous events is rich, EZ’s main representation result does
not clarify satisfactorily when the proposed deﬁnition delivers probabilistic so-
phistication on unambiguous events. We conclude by conjecturing that these
problems indicate the existence of inherent limitations of a strictly behavioral
approach to identifying probabilistic beliefs in the presence of ambiguity, rather
than deﬁciencies in EZ’s implementation of that approach.
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11. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question in the theory of decision-making under uncertainty is the
identiﬁcation of a decision-maker’s probabilistic beliefs from preferences. This has
been addressed in the literature so far mainly under the heading of ﬁnding an ap-
propriate deﬁnition of “unambiguous events”. The earliest proposals of Ghirardato-
Marinacci (2001), Nehring (1999)1 and Zhang (2002) all imply expected utility max-
imization over unambiguous acts (acts measurable with respect to unambiguous
events), and are therefore inapplicable to decision-makers who depart from SEU not
just for reasons of ambiguity, but also for reasons of probabilistic risk-attitudes as
exempliﬁed by the Allais paradox. Epstein-Zhang’s (2001, henceforth EZ) contribu-
tion is the ﬁrst and hitherto only contribution to attempt a “behaviorally general”
(“model-free”) deﬁnition. This appears to be a big step forward beyond the existing
deﬁnitions in that it promises to deliver a generally applicable distinction between
risk and ambiguity. In this note, we ask whether their deﬁnition works as intended.
EZ’s principal criterion of the success of a deﬁnition of unambiguous events is that it
delivers probabilistic sophistication on unambiguous acts. To demonstrate the success
of their deﬁnition, the main representation result in EZ provides suﬃcient conditions
that entail this property. While these lo o kf a i r l yw e a k ,w es h o wb ye x a m p l et h a t
even when preferences are extremely well-behaved (e.g. of the MEU variety) and the
set of unambiguous events is “rich”, they may exhibit the Ellsberg paradox on the
set of EZ-unambiguous acts; a fortiori, such preferences cannot be probabilistically
sophisticated on unambiguous acts. EZ thus fail to achieve the intended separation
of probabilistic risk from ambiguity.2
1Building in part on Ghirardato et al. (2003), an equivalent deﬁnition is also proposed in Ghi-
rardato et al. (2004).
2For a technically deep analysis of EZ unambiguous events in the context of the MEU model that
in part builds on and develops the observations of this note, see Amarante-Filiz (2004).
2Our counterexamples do not contradict EZ’s representation result at the formal
level. Instead, they reveal that the content of one of their key axioms on preferences
is not what it seems to be; in particular we shall argue that this axiom (“Small
Unambiguous Event Continuity”) cannot interpreted as merely imposing “richness”
on the set of unambiguous events, contrary to what is suggested by EZ. It thus
remains an open question when (that is: under what conditions formulated directly in
terms of preferences) the EZ deﬁnition “works” in the sense of delivering probabilistic
sophistication on unambiguous events.3
There are two possible types of responses to our observations. On the one hand,
one may conjecture that EZ’s choice of a particular purely behavioral deﬁnition of
unambiguous events was not right one, and try to come up with a better one by
either reﬁning EZ’s or starting from scratch. Alternatively, one may conclude that
the problems identiﬁed here are likely to resurface for alternative purely behavioral
deﬁnitions, and that some non-behavioral element such as the exogenous identiﬁcation
of a subfamily of unambiguous events must be assumed to begin with. We have
written this note out of a belief in the second type of response as the more promising,
that is: out of a belief that the limitations of EZ’s proposal are not accidental, but
indicative of a fundamental, deep-seated diﬃculty in conceptualizing decision making
under ambiguity itself.
2. THE EPSTEIN-ZHANG DEFINITION FOR BETTING
PREFERENCES
Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space where S is the set of states and the universe of
events Σ is a σ-algebra. Throughout, we will focus on domains with two possible
3Kopylov (2003) has provided an elegant modiﬁcation of EZ’s representation result. However, as
explained below in section 2, Kopylov’s result does not help address the issues raised in this note.
3outcomes only, win and lose. This case not only allows to simplify the exposition
signiﬁcantly, it is also central to the intuitive motivation of EZ’s deﬁnition of unam-
biguous events. With only two outcomes, one can denote the act [win on A, lose
on A] (“betting on A”) simply by the event A ∈ Σ. Thus, the decision maker is
characterized by a preference ordering over events %; the preference ordering % is
assumed to be monotone and non-degenerate.
Axiom 1 (Monotonicity) A % B whenever A ⊇ B, and A Â B whenever A\B is
non-null, i.e. whenever (A\B) ∪ C Â ∅ for some C ∈ Σ.
Axiom 2 (Non-Degeneracy) S Â ∅.
I nt h et w oo u t c o m ec o n t e x t ,E Z ’ sd e ﬁnition of an unambiguous event amounts to
the following.
Deﬁnition 1 An event T is unambiguous if, for all A,B disjoint from T, A % B
if and only A ∪ T % B ∪ T, and if the same holds for Tc instead of T.
The family of all unambiguous events is denoted by A. Intuitively, an event is
unambiguous if it is evaluated separably by the decision maker. As pointed out
by EZ, in the context of the typical ambiguity-averse preferences in the Ellsberg
experiment with one urn with three colors the deﬁnition successfully identifyies the
color with known frequency as unambiguous, and the other two as ambiguous.
The question at the center of EZ and of this note is the extent to which this deﬁni-
tion yields well-deﬁned subjective probabilities over the family of unambiguous events
A in general. There are several criteria to determine whether, given a preference or-
dering %, the decision-maker has “well-deﬁned subjective probabilities” over a given
family of events B ⊇ {∅,S}. The central criterion of EZ is the requirement that pref-
4erences over acts measurable with respect to B be “probabilistically sophisticated”.4
In a two-outcome context, this boils down to the following requirement.
(Probabilistic Sophistication on B) There exists a ﬁnitely addi-
tive set-function p : B → [0,1] with p(S) = 1 such that, for all A,B ∈ B,
A % B if and only if p(A) ≥ p(B). (1)
If it is indeed appropriate to attribute well-deﬁned subjective probabilities to all
events in B, then one should be able to attribute such probabilities to all events whose
probability can be deduced from those in B. This leads to the requirement that B
be a λ-system; a family B is a (ﬁnite) λ-system if it is closed under complementation
and disjoint union, i.e. if i) S ∈ B, ii) A ∈ B implies Ac ∈ B, and iii) A,B ∈ B and
A∩B = ∅ implies A∪B ∈ B; B is a countable λ-system if it is closed under countable
disjoint unions, i.e. if ∪∞
i=1Ai ∈ B whenever the Ai ∈ B are mutually disjoint.
When does EZ’s deﬁnition of unambiguous events A deliver probabilistic sophis-
tication on unambiguous events A, preferably with A a λ-system? It is clear from
the outset that one cannot expect this to happen in full generality, even when all
events are unambiguous (A = Σ); for in this case, % is what is called a “qualitative
probability” in the literature, and Kraft et al. (1959) have shown that qualitative
probabilities on ﬁnite state spaces need not be representable in terms of numeric
probabilities.
To support their deﬁnition and overcome this diﬃculty, the main result in EZ
provides assumptions on preferences which ensure that preferences on unambiguous
acts are probabilistically sophisticated. Applied to betting preferences, EZ make the
4Arguably, having beliefs p entails substantially more than condition (1), for example the extend-
ability of p to an additive set-function on all of Σ; however, since the main point of this note con-
cerns the diﬃculty of guaranteeing Probabilistic Sophistication on A, the family of EZ-unambiguous
events, these additional desiderata are not be discussed here.
5following assumptions. The ﬁrst one is central to their result, while the technical is
merely auxiliary.
Axiom 3 (Small Unambiguous Event Continuity) For any A,B ∈ A such that
A Â B, there exist partitions {Ci}i∈N and {Dj}j∈M in A that reﬁne the partitions
{A,Ac} respectively {B,Bc} such that A\Ci Â B for all i ∈ N and A Â B ∪ Dj for
all j ∈ M.
Axiom 4 (Monotone Continuity) Consider any decreasing sequence {Ai}∞
i=1 in
A, B,C in A with B disjoint from A1. Then Ai ∪B % C for all i implies (∩∞
i=1Ai)∪
B % C.
Restricted to bets, a corrected version of EZ’s main result is the following:
Theorem 1 Let % a monotone preference order over bets and assume that the cor-
responding set of unambiguous events A is a countable λ-system. Then the following
two statements are equivalent:
1. % satisﬁes Non-Degeneracy, Small Unambiguous Event Continuity, and Monotone
Continuity.
2. There exists a (unique) convex-ranged and countably additive probability mea-
sure p on A such that, for all A,B ∈ A,
A % B if and only if p(A) ≥ p(B).
In contrast to Theorem 1, in EZ’s original statement (EZ, Theorem 5.2), the λ-
system property of A is derived rather than assumed; however, according to Kopylov
(2003, p. 31), this claim is false.5 Kopylov (2003) shows instead that, in general,
5It is an open question to what extent this property can be derived from intuitively more primitive
assumptions. Amarante-Filiz (2004) show that A is a λ-system whenever preferences have an MEU
representation.
6A is closed under disjoint countable unions of a particular kind, calling the result-
ing generalization of λ-systems “mosaics”. In an elegant extension of EZ’s work, he
also provides a derivation of probabilistic sophistication on A for the general case
of mosaics assuming a strengthened version of Axiom 3 (ibid., Corollary 4.2) while
dispensing with Monotone Continuity. Since we will argue that Axiom 3 is too re-
strictive already, the following analysis applies to Kopylov’s version of EZ’s result as
well.
3. DO EZ UNAMBIGUOUS EVENTS SEPARATE RISK FROM
AMBIGUITY?
Crucial to the assessment of the import of Theorem 1 is an assessment of the domain
of its applicability. The following examples will show that it is substantially smaller
than apparent and, more importantly, not transparently deﬁned.
Example 1. Fix any event T ∈ Σ. Let Π1 and Π2 denote two (weak∗−)closed
and convex sets of ﬁnitely additive probability measures such that π(T)=1f o ra l l
π ∈ Π1 and π(T)=0f o ra l lπ ∈ Π2, and ﬁx α,β such that 0 <α<β<1. Deﬁne
the (weak∗−)closed and convex set Π as follows,
Π := {γπ1 +( 1− γ)π2 | α ≤ γ ≤ β, π1 ∈ Π1,π 2 ∈ Π2}, (2)
and let preferences over events determined by their lower probability given Π,





It is easily seen that for any such preference relation, both T and Tc are EZ-unambiguous!
Observation 1 For any preference relation deﬁned by (2) and (3), {T,Tc} ⊆ A












π (A)+( 1− β).
Hence evidently, for all A,B ⊆ T,




π (B) if and only if A ∪ T
c % B ∪ T
c.
Similarly, for all A,B ⊆ Tc




π(B) if and only if A ∪ T % B ∪ T,
establishing that both T and Tc are unambiguous.
Since α<β ,this classiﬁcation is clearly counterintuitive. In this example, the fact
that preferences are separable in {T,Tc} (that is: {T,Tc} ⊆ A) picks up the separa-
bility of Π implied by (2), but has nothing to do with the existence of probabilistic
beliefs with respect to the events T and Tc.6
In general, it might be the case that T and Tc are the only non-trivial unambiguous
events, in which case preferences are “probabilistically sophisticated on A” in a trivial
way. Consider, however, cases in which the set of events over which the decision-maker
has probabilistic beliefs is rich in an intuitive sense.
Example 2. Speciﬁcally, assume that the state space is the product of a space
with two “subjective” states and a continuous state space representing a continuous
random device, S = {b,r}×[0,1], with Σ =2 {b,r} × Σ2 where Σ2 denotes the Borel-
σ-algebra on [0,1]. One may think of {b,r} as representing the outcome of a draw
6The example easily extends to multi-outcome domains by adopting, for example, the MEU
model; separability conditions as in (2) arise naturally in dynamic versions of this model, see Ep-
stein/Schneider (2003).
8from an unknown urn with black and red balls. Let µ denote some convex-ranged
probability measure on Σ2, and let T = {b}×[0,1]. Say that betting preferences
are compatible with independent randomization if and only if, for all A,B ∈ Σ,A%
B whenever µ(A ∩ T) ≥ µ(B ∩ T)a sw e l la sµ(A ∩ Tc) ≥ µ(B ∩ Tc), that is:
whenever A is at least as likely than B, conditional on either T or Tc. Independent
randomization gives rise to a class of counterexamples that do not make use of the
MEU functional form.
Observation 2 Whenever the preference ordering % is compatible with independent
randomization, {T,Tc} ⊆ A.
Again, as in Example 1, the unambiguity of the events T and Tc reﬂects a separa-
bility structure that has nothing to do with the existence of probabilistic beliefs over
these events. It is thus not very surprising that combining these two examples, one
obtains the 2-color version of the Ellsberg paradox within the family of unambiguous
events.
Example 3. Indeed, let Π1 be the singleton {π1}, with π1 (A): =µ(A ∩ T);
likewise, let Π2 be the singleton {π2}, with π2 (A): =µ(A ∩ Tc). The preference
relation %3 deﬁned by (2) and (3) can be seen as a Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) MEU
preference relation in a two-state Anscombe-Aumann framework translated into a
Savage setting. Let A3 denote the associated family of unambiguous events. The
following Fact is easily veriﬁed.
Fact 1 A ∈ A3 iﬀ
i) µ(A ∩ T)=µ(A ∩ Tc) or
ii) µ(A ∩ T)=1and µ(A ∩ Tc)=0 , or µ(A ∩ T)=0and µ(A ∩ Tc)=1 .
The family of events satisfying i) (denoted by R)r e ﬂects the assumed compatibility
with independent randomization, while those satisfying ii) correspond to Observation
2. Fact 1 immediately entails the following Observation.
9Observation 3 %3 displays the Ellsberg paradox on A3; that is, there exist events
A,B ∈ A3 such that A Â B and Ac Â Bc.
To see this, take any E ∈ Σ2 such that α<µ(E) <β ; then by construction
{b}×[0,1] ≺3 {b,r}×E and {r}×[0,1] ≺3 {b,r}×E
c. (4)
Since in view of Fact 1 all four events are EZ-unambiguous, preferences display the
Ellsberg paradox on A3.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF EZ’S
REPRESENTATION THEOREM
What is going wrong here? Clearly, Theorem 1 cannot apply since (4) is inconsistent
with Probabilistic Sophistication on A3.A s A3 is evidently a λ-system in view of
Fact 1, the culprit must be Axiom 3. Indeed, Axiom 3 fails to hold since the events
{b}×[0,1] and {r}×[0,1] cannot be partitioned into strictly smaller unambiguous
subsets. On the other hand, A3 does contain a “rich” subset of unambiguous events,
namely the set of “random” events R. Note in particular that Axiom 3, when restricted
to random events R, is satisﬁed by %3. In view of this, the richness motivation of
Axiom 3 would only justify requiring Small Event Continuity with respect to some
subset B of A, a condition much weaker than Axiom 3. 7
7The surprising strength on Small Event Continuity on λ-systems can be viewed as mirroring
a disanalogy of convex-rangedness of probability measures deﬁned on σ−algebras and those on
countable λ-systems. Speciﬁcally, suppose that p is a probability measure on a countable λ-system
D that is convex-ranged on some family B ⊆ D.I f D is a closed under intersections (hence
a σ−algebra), p is must be convex-ranged on the larger family D as well; yet as shown by an
appropriate specialization of Example 2, this conclusion does not hold if D is merely a λ-system.
If one interprets B as an exogeneously given set of unambiguous events, and D as the “true” set of
unambiguous events (however deﬁned) this observation suggests that in general, one cannot expect
convex-rangedness of p to extend to the endogeneously deﬁned “true” set of unambiguous events.
10Requiring Small Event Continuity with respect to A itself yields an assumption
that lacks transparent intuitive content and is more and intransparently restrictive
strong. The lack of transparency of the Small Event Continuity axiom is attributable
in part to its reliance on the endogeneously deﬁned family of unambiguous events A,
a notion whose content EZ’s main result, Theorem 1, was meant to clarify with the
crucial help of this axiom itself.
It thus remains an open question whether there are suﬃcient conditions of rea-
sonable generality that are formulated directly in terms of preferences and ensure
Probabilistic Sophistication over unambiguous acts. Indeed, it is not obvious that
such conditions exist. As Example 2 shows, even the presence of a continuous inde-
pendent random device is not enough.
E x a m p l e s1a n d2a l s or a i s eq u e s t i o n sc o n c e r ning the conceptual interpretation of
the EZ deﬁnition. EZ view their deﬁnition of unambiguous events as meaningful
whenever preferences are monotone (satisfy P3), including, for example, situations in
which the state space is ﬁnite. This conceptual assumption appears to be necessary
if the deﬁnition is used in some of the preference axioms (such as Axiom 3); furtm
hermore, there is nothing in the behavioral pattern identiﬁed by the EZ deﬁnition that
would warrant a restriction to particular kinds of monotone preference relations. The
existence of even one preference relation within its domain of legislation displaying
the Ellsberg paradox on unambiguous events suggests that the EZ deﬁnition does not
capture absence of ambiguity in a consistent, conceptually primitive manner.8
8Thus, the upshot of our examples is that the EZ deﬁnition is “too weak”. Conversely, one
may ask whether it always ﬁnds all “truly” unambiguous events. In this regard, it has been argued
before by Klibanoﬀ et al. (2003) that the EZ deﬁnition may sometimes be “too strong” by classifying
genuinely unambiguous events as ambiguous; put diﬀerently, their criticism is to point out that the
EZ deﬁnition builds in assumptions on preferences over unambiguous acts that do not follow from
the existence of probabilistic beliefs over unambiguous events per se.
115. CONCLUSION
We conclude from the above observations, reinforced by those of Kopylov (2003)
and Klibanoﬀ et al. (2003), that EZ’s deﬁnition of “unambiguous” events fails to
deliver a satisfactory separation between risk and ambiguity,
There are two basic responses to this state of aﬀairs. On the one hand, it may
be the case that the EZ deﬁnition is basically on the right track, but needs to be
“ﬁxed” somehow. For example, in the context of Example 2, one feels that the event
{b}×[0,1] (“black”) cannot really be unambiguous unless events of the from {b}×E
representing conjunctions of the original event {b}×[0,1] with independent random
events [0,1] × E are unambiguous as well. A natural approach to ﬁxing the EZ
deﬁnition would therefore be to try to reﬁne it by building in closure with respect
to such conjunctions. While such a move may have some appeal at a formal level, it
is not clear whether it can made without losing the intuitive behavioral motivation
that makes the EZ deﬁnition attractive in the ﬁrst place; furthermore, it raises the
question of how to identify the existence of a rich set of independent random events
in purely behavioral terms (as opposed to ﬁxing it exogeneously as done here in the
deﬁnition of “compatible with independent randomization”), a question that may not
be more easily solvable than that of identifying unambiguous events in the ﬁrst place.
Alternatively, one may conclude that a non-epistemic deﬁnition of “unambiguous”
events is unlikely to yield probabilistic sophistication on unambiguous acts, and, even
more so, epistemically motivated properties such as the closure under disjoint unions
characteristic of λ-system. In other words, one needs to put in more epistemic content
into the deﬁnition of “unambiguous” from the very beginning.
More radically, it may be necessary to exogeneously specify some events as un-
ambiguous, in order to infer the unamiguity of others behaviorally. This could be
justiﬁed by imputing certain probabilistic beliefs to the agent on the basis of ver-
12bal testimony or a hypothesized and behaviorally falsiﬁable shared understanding of
certain aspects of the decision situation, an approach developed in detail in Nehring
(2001,2006). Beliefs of this kind are, in fact, already imputed implicitly in appli-
cations of the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework to the modeling of preferences
under ambiguity.
While such a move has a lot going for it, it represents a break with the strictly
behaviorist revealed preference approach to decision theory pioneered by Ramsey
and Savage, an approach that continues to dominate much of decision theory and
that centrally inspired the Epstein and Zhang’s contribution. We conjecture that its
limitations do not reﬂect limitations of the authors in implementing their behaviorist
approach but instead reﬂect deep-seated limitations of that approach itself.
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